

A Complete Bibliography of *ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)*

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Title word cross-reference

α [CR17]. \exists [GMVY18].
-Strongly [CR17].
ACM [CM13, CM17]. **Ad** [CV15, NW18].
Adversarial [EKM18]. **Advertising**
[CMV15, GMMV15, GMS15, NW18]. **Affine**
[NS15]. **After** [CCS17]. **Agenda** [ABC⁺15].
Agents [CCK⁺16, DSE15, GK16, YOA⁺13].
Aggregation [KKL19]. **Algorithmic**
[FN13]. **Algorithms** [BK20, SSCD14].
Allocation [AV20, CEK16, EKM18, NW18].
Allocations [KPS18]. **Alternating**
[CEK16]. **Altruism** [CDKS14, HS13].
Amazon [BYBYST13]. **Analysis** [KFH15, JP13]. **Anarchy** [BGR14, CDKS14,
CDD⁺14, CKST16, PNS16, Rou15].
Anonymity [RS16]. **Antifolk** [PRU17].
Applications [CR17, RW18]. **Approach**
[EG16]. **Approximate**
[CFGS15, FS16, GR16, PT13].
Approximately [CBGdK⁺20].
Approximating [AKS17]. **Approximation**
[BK20]. **Arbitrage** [CMV15]. **Arrow**
[DGV16]. **Assignment** [FB17, FSZ18].
Atomic [HS13]. **Auction** [AKLV17].
Auctioning [ADH15]. **Auctions**
[AMS14, Ass20, ADH15, BL16, CDE⁺14,
CMV15, CKST16, CR17, CBLHS15,
CBGdK⁺20, DFI14, DHS15, DHW15,
DHS18, HIMM13, HK15, KP13, RGKK16].
Automated [OPRS13]. **Averse** [DSE15].
Axiomatic [FSST19].

Back [CM17]. **Bad** [EPR19]. **Badge** [EG16]. **Based** [BB17, DFJ⁺15, DHS18, GMS15]. **Bayesian** [CR17, GK17]. **be** [EPR19]. **Behavior** [FP16]. **Behavioral** [EPR19]. **Best** [CDE⁺14]. **Best-Response** [CDE⁺14]. **Better** [HR20]. **Beyond** [PPS15]. **Bid** [HN19]. **Bid-Limited** [HN19]. **Bidders** [DHK⁺16, HK15]. **Bidding** [SG20]. **Bimatrix** [FS16]. **Binary** [ABC⁺15, YOA⁺13]. **Boolean** [GNR18]. **Border** [GNR18]. **Borders** [GNR18]. **Boundary** [JLSW17]. **Bounded** [BGP15]. **Bounded-Distance** [BGP15]. **Bounds** [CKST16, GR16]. **Budget** [DDW18, DHS15]. **Budgeting** [GKSA19]. **Budgets** [CBLHS15]. **Buyer** [RW18].

Call [WS15]. **can** [EPR19]. **Capacity** [FG16]. **Cardinal** [GH18]. **Case** [BGR14]. **Causal** [IO18]. **Characteristic** [MSR⁺14]. **Characterization** [FSST19]. **Checking** [HH13]. **Chief** [PS17]. **Choices** [BFK17]. **Classifiers** [DFJ⁺15]. **Cloud** [KKS19, SG20]. **Co** [PS17]. **Co-Editors-in-Chief** [PS17]. **Coalitions** [FG16]. **Collective** [ABC⁺15]. **Combinatorial** [Ass20, BL16, CEK16, CBGdK⁺20, DHS18]. **Committee** [FSST19]. **Common** [CCS17]. **Communities** [ZPvdS14]. **Comparative** [HV16]. **Competition** [PST14]. **Competitive** [HPS⁺18, KP13, Sar13]. **Completeness** [GMVY18]. **Complexity** [AM14, BB15, GPS13, GR16, OPR16, SSCD14]. **Compressions** [DHS18]. **Computation** [BBH⁺17, CFGS15, H MV16, MSR⁺14, CM13]. **Computational** [HP19]. **Computing** [BB17, JLSW17]. **Concepts** [BB17]. **Congestion** [BGR14, BV19, CFGS15, CG16, GKK20, HS13, KR15]. **Connected** [AD15]. **Connection** [ACV13]. **Consensus** [HH13, MT13]. **Constrain** [FG16]. **Constraints** [DDW18, FG16, FSZ18]. **Contagious** [BEK⁺13]. **Contest** [GK16]. **Contests** [GH18]. **Continuous** [HLPV18]. **Convergence** [AKLV17, CDE⁺14]. **Convex** [ACV13, DGV16]. **Cookie** [GMMV15]. **Correlated** [ABF⁺17, BB15, MS15]. **Cost** [GKK20, RS16]. **Cost-Sharing** [GKK20, RS16]. **Covering** [BKPS14, MS15]. **Creation** [AEED⁺14, BGP15]. **Cross** [HH13]. **cryptographic** [GLR13]. **Current** [CEK16].

Data [GILR20, WYZ18]. **Debreu** [DGV16]. **Decision** [CKRS14, FP16, GMVY18]. **Decisions** [ABC⁺15]. **Deconstructing** [BYBYST13]. **Delay** [SG20]. **Delivery** [CV15]. **Design** [BFT16, BL16, EG16, FZ15, GK16, HH13, H MV16, KNP13, MS15, PT13, RTC16, XV15]. **Designing** [KS19]. **Deterministic** [FT14]. **Differentiated** [SG20]. **Digital** [AMS14]. **Discriminant** [DFJ⁺15]. **Discriminant-Based** [DFJ⁺15]. **Display** [CMV15, GMS15]. **Distance** [BGP15]. **Distributed** [ADH19, ASA17, FTW20, JLSW17]. **Distributions** [BBDS17, CR17]. **Divisible** [ADH15]. **Division** [AD15, BK20, Vel18]. **Do** [Ass20, CPS16, FG16]. **Does** [HM16]. **Domains** [FZ15, NS15, NPJ13]. **Dominance** [BB17, HKV16]. **Dominance-Based** [BB17]. **Dominant** [PPS15, NPJ13]. **dominant-strategy** [NPJ13]. **Double** [AKLV17]. **Dynamic** [AV20, BDKS15, BV19, RSUW20]. **Dynamics** [AFM⁺19, COP13, CDE⁺14, JLSW17, YOA⁺13].

Each [KKL19]. **Earning** [BGHM19]. **EC'12** [LBI15]. **EC'14** [CE16]. **EC'15** [FLS18]. **EC'16** [CB19]. **EC'17** [Ano20]. **EC2** [BYBYST13]. **Economic** [EG16]. **Economics** [CM13, GMMV15]. **Editing** [CM17]. **Editorial** [CM17, PS17]. **Editors** [PS17]. **Effectiveness** [GMS15]. **Efficiency**

[AD15, GKK20]. **Efficient** [ACV13, CFGS15, CBGdK⁺20]. **Election** [ADH19]. **Electric** [CEK16]. **Elicitation** [KS19]. **Eliciting** [CKRS14]. **Envy** [AKS17]. **Envy-Free** [AKS17]. **Equilibria** [AEED⁺14, BBH⁺17, COP18, CFGS15, FS16, GKK20, GMVY18, GR16, KYY20, KR15]. **Equilibrium** [BB15, GPS13, HP19, KFH15, OPR16, RS14]. **Equitable** [Vel18]. **ESP** [JP13]. **Estimates** [HH13]. **Evolving** [AFM⁺19]. **Ex** [DDW18, RS14]. **Ex-Post** [DDW18, RS14]. **Examples** [BGR14]. **Exchange** [KMRR18, XV15]. **Exclusive** [KNP13]. **Existence** [CFGS15, GKK20]. **Exploitation** [GS15]. **Exposing** [BKPS14]. **Expressive** [DHW15]. **Extensions** [PPS15]. **Externalities** [HIMM13]. **Extraction** [HH13].

Facility [FT14]. **Fair** [AD15, BK20]. **Fairness** [CKM⁺19, OPR16, PPS15]. **Farewell** [CM17]. **Fast** [AKLV17]. **Few** [AKL19]. **Finding** [FS16]. **Finite** [BBH⁺17]. **First** [CKST16]. **First-Price** [CKST16]. **Fisher** [BGHM19]. **Fit** [SSCD14]. **Flooded** [FZ15]. **Formation** [BEK⁺13]. **Fractional** [ABB⁺19]. **Framework** [KS19]. **Free** [AKS17, KNP13]. **Function** [MSR⁺14]. **Functions** [GNR18]. **Fundamental** [WYZ18]. **Future** [CM17].

Game [ADH19, AEED⁺14, EG16, FN13, HKMN16, IO18, JLSW17, JP13]. **Game-Theoretic** [ADH19, IO18, JP13]. **Games** [ABB⁺19, BKPS14, BGR14, BGP15, BV19, BBH⁺17, COP13, CFGS15, CSV20, CG16, FS16, FTW20, FT14, GKK20, HP19, HS13, KYY20, KR15, MSR⁺14, PRU17, Rou15]. **Gamification** [EG16]. **Generalized** [FB17, GKK20, MSR⁺14]. **Geometric** [FW17]. **Geometry** [COP13]. **Global** [BKPS14]. **Going** [BMM18]. **Good** [EPR19]. **Goodness** [SSCD14]. **Goodness-of-Fit** [SSCD14]. **Goods** [AMS14, ADH15, BHSZ15, FSZ18]. **Graphical** [COP18]. **Greedy** [BL16]. **Grid** [CEK16]. **Groups** [AFM⁺19].

Half [HR20]. **Hedonic** [ABB⁺19]. **Heterogeneous** [AMPS20, ADH15, DHS15]. **Hierarchy** [FSST19]. **Homotopy** [GPS13]. **Howson** [GPS13].

Impact [CDKS14]. **Impartial** [BFK17]. **Imperfect** [XV15]. **Implementation** [MSR⁺14]. **Improved** [HM16]. **Improving** [GMS15]. **Incentive** [WYZ18]. **Incentives** [EG16, IM15]. **Incomplete** [Rou15]. **Increase** [HM16]. **Indivisibilities** [PPS15]. **Inference** [IO18]. **Information** [BKPS14, KS19, Rou15]. **Instance** [BYBYST13]. **Integrating** [HLPV18]. **Interaction** [Ass20]. **Interdependent** [RTC16]. **Internship** [BAHR18]. **Introduction** [Ano20, CI15, CB19, CE16, FN13, FLS18, LBI15, MT16, CM13]. **Israeli** [BAHR18]. **Issue** [Ano20, CI15, CB19, CE16, FN13, FLS18, KKL19, LBI15]. **Items** [DHS15].

Keyword [CBLHS15]. **Knapsack** [GKSA19].

Large [AKS17, IM15, PRU17]. **Leader** [ADH19]. **Learning** [ACV13, BMM18, FP16]. **Lemke** [GPS13]. **Leximin** [KPS18]. **Limit** [HLPV18]. **Limitations** [BL16, PPS15]. **Limited** [BDKS15, HN19]. **Limits** [BGHM19, DHS15, WYZ18]. **Linear** [DGV16, GILR20]. **Liquidity** [OPRS13]. **Liquidity-Sensitive** [OPRS13]. **Lists** [HPS⁺18]. **Local** [HMV16]. **Location** [FT14]. **Looking** [CM17].

Maker [OPRS13]. **Makers** [HLPV18].

Making [ACV13, CKRS14, MT13]. **Market** [ACV13, HLPV18, OPRS13]. **Markets** [AKS17, BGHM19, DGV16, EFRS20, HLPV18, IM15, IO18, KNP13, Sar13]. **Match** [BAHR18, GMMV15]. **Matching** [AV20, AKL19, ASA17, FIT⁺15, GMMV15, KYY20]. **Maximin** [BK20]. **Maximization** [BHSZ15, DDW18, DHK⁺16, EFG⁺14, RSUW20]. **Maximizers** [NS15]. **Maximum** [ASA17, CKM⁺19]. **Measures** [SSCD14]. **Mechanism** [BFT16, BL16, DHW15, FB17, FZ15, GK17, HH13, HVM16, KNP13, MS15, PT13, RTC16]. **Mechanisms** [ABF⁺17, CEK16, CCK⁺16, DSE15, FT14, KS19, RS14, RW18, WYZ18, WS15, NPJ13]. **Mediated** [Sar13]. **Mediators** [BFT16]. **Medical** [BAHR18]. **Method** [GPS13]. **Microfinance** [IO18]. **Minimal** [FW17]. **Minimizing** [RW19]. **Minimum** [ASA17, FIT⁺15]. **Mixed** [ASA17]. **Mixing** [EKM18]. **Model** [IO18]. **Models** [EKM18]. **Modest** [Ass20]. **Monetary** [HKV16]. **Money** [PT13]. **Monitoring** [XV15]. **Monotonicity** [RW18]. **Multi** [EFRS20, GMVY18]. **Multi-Player** [GMVY18]. **Multi-Unit** [EFRS20]. **Multidimensional** [RSUW20]. **Multimarket** [HV16]. **Multiplayer** [IO18]. **Multiple** [CBLHS15, KKL19, RW19]. **Myopic** [CDE⁺14].

Nash [AEED⁺14, CFGS15, CKM⁺19, FS16, GMVY18]. **Near** [BKPS14, COP13, MS15, NW18]. **Near-Optimal** [MS15]. **Near-Optimality** [BKPS14]. **Near-Optimum** [NW18]. **Near-Potential** [COP13]. **Need** [Ass20]. **Network** [AEED⁺14, BGP15, BEK⁺13, HIMM13, RS16]. **Networked** [IO18]. **Noisy** [CPS16]. **Nonequilibrium** [FP16]. **Nonexcludable** [BHSZ15].

Observations [KNP13]. **Online** [ACV13, DHK⁺16, GMMV15, KP13, NW18, ZPvdS14]. **Opaque** [BMM18]. **Opinion** [YOA⁺13]. **Opponent** [GS15]. **Optimal** [GK16, HIMM13, KMRR18, MS15, NPJ13, RTC16, XV15]. **Optimality** [BKPS14]. **Optimization** [ACV13, DHK⁺16]. **Optimize** [CV15]. **Optimum** [NW18]. **Oral** [AKLV17]. **Orders** [HLPV18]. **Our** [CM17].

Packet [HPS⁺18]. **Page** [DHK⁺16]. **Paradox** [HV16]. **parameter** [NPJ13]. **Pareto** [KMRR18]. **Participatory** [GKSA19]. **Payment** [DFJ⁺15]. **payments** [NPJ13]. **Payoff** [FS16]. **Payoffs** [EPR19]. **Peer** [AMPS20, FW17]. **Perfect** [KYY20]. **Performance** [KR18]. **Perspective** [ADH19, FW17]. **Pieces** [AD15]. **Platforms** [XV15]. **Player** [GMVY18]. **Players** [MS15]. **Polynomial** [BV19, CG16]. **Position** [CDE⁺14]. **Positions** [KKL19]. **Positive** [HIMM13]. **Post** [DDW18, RS14]. **Posted** [ABF⁺17]. **Posted-Price** [ABF⁺17]. **Posting** [BBDS17]. **Potential** [COP13]. **Power** [BFK17, CEK16, FT14, FZ15]. **Practical** [OPRS13]. **Predicted** [EPR19]. **Prediction** [AMPS20, DSE15, FW17, HLPV18]. **Predictions** [CKRS14]. **Preference** [SSCD14]. **Preferences** [BMM18, CCS17]. **Presence** [BEK⁺13]. **Price** [ABF⁺17, BBM13, BGR14, CDKS14, CDD⁺14, CG16, CKST16, PNS16, Rou15]. **Prices** [BBDS17]. **Pricing** [AKS17, BDKS15, BYBYST13, COP18, EFRS20, KKS19, RSUW20, SG20]. **Prior** [KNP13]. **Prior-Free** [KNP13]. **Priorities** [BMM18]. **Priority** [HPS⁺18]. **Privacy** [CCK⁺16, CSV20, DFI14, WYZ18]. **Private** [KMRR18]. **Pro** [EPR19]. **Pro-sociality** [EPR19]. **Problem** [AKL19, FB17, FP16, FSZ18]. **Problems** [MS15]. **Profit** [HH13]. **Program** [DGV16]. **Projects** [GNR18]. **Protocols** [ADH19, ZPvdS14, GLR13]. **Provision** [CCS17]. **Provision-After-Wait** [CCS17].

Public [GNR18]. **Pure** [CFGS15, KR15].
Put [ABC⁺15].

Quantitative [HV16]. **Queries**
[AKL19, FS16]. **Query**
[AM14, BB15, GR16]. **Quotas** [FIT⁺15].

R [GMVY18]. **R-Completeness**
[GMVY18]. **Random**
[AMS14, FSZ18, IM15]. **Ranking**
[RGKK16]. **Rating** [ZPvdS14]. **Ratio**
[KP13]. **Rational** [DGV16]. **rationality**
[GLR13]. **Real** [KPS18]. **Recaps** [FP16].
Recency [FP16]. **Recommendations**
[CKRS14]. **Recommender** [DFI14].
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Regular [CR17]. **Rent** [Vel18]. **Repeated**
[PRU17]. **Reserves** [RW19]. **Resource**
[PPS15]. **Response** [CDE⁺14]. **Restoring**
[KR15]. **Results** [SSCD14]. **Reveal**
[CPS16]. **Revealed** [SSCD14]. **Revenue**
[AKS17, BHSZ15, DDW18, EFG⁺14, HM16,
RW18]. **Reward** [KS19]. **Ring** [CDD⁺14].
Risk [BEK⁺13, DSE15, PNS16].
Risk-Averse [DSE15]. **Robust**
[HV16, MS15, RTC16]. **Routing**
[CDD⁺14, HPS⁺18]. **Rules**
[AM14, DFJ⁺15, FSST19].

Safe [GS15]. **Sampling** [AMS14, KP13].
Scheduling [GK17]. **Schemes**
[EFG⁺14, KKS19]. **Scores** [KR18]. **Scoring**
[AM14, FSST19]. **Scrip** [KFH15]. **Search**
[CBLHS15, RGKK16]. **Secondary** [HK15].
Selection [BFK17, GPS13]. **Selfish**
[CDD⁺14, EPR19, NS15]. **Selling**
[HR20, KNP13]. **Sensitive** [OPRS13].
Sensitivity [PNS16]. **Separately** [HR20].
Sequential
[ABF⁺17, BBH⁺17, GLR13, HP19, KYY20].
Service [XV15]. **Services** [SG20]. **Shaping**
[CV15]. **Sharing** [GKK20, RS16].

Shopbots [Sar13]. **Shopbots-Mediated**
[Sar13]. **Sided** [CBGdK⁺20, IM15].
Signaling [EFG⁺14, FTW20, PST14].
Simple [FP16, GK16, KKS19, RW18].
Simultaneous [CKST16]. **Single**
[WS15, NPJ13]. **Single-Call** [WS15].
single-parameter [NPJ13]. **Smart**
[CEK16]. **Social** [AFM⁺19, PST14].
sociality [EPR19]. **Socially** [XV15].
Socially-Optimal [XV15]. **Solution**
[BB17]. **Solutions** [GPS13]. **Some** [KNP13].
Sources [GILR20]. **Special** [Ano20, CII5,
CB19, CE16, FLS18, LBI15, FN13].
Spectrum [HK15]. **Spikes** [EKM18].
Sponsored [CBLHS15, RGKK16]. **Spot**
[BYBYST13]. **Stability** [CG16].
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Strategic [BFT16, GILR20, IO18, WYZ18].
Strategies [SG20]. **strategy** [NPJ13].
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[DHK⁺16, FSZ18, HK15]. **Subsidized**
[DSE15]. **Supply** [BDKS15]. **Symmetric**
[GMVY18, HK15]. **Systems**
[CEK16, DFI14, KFH15].

Targeted [NW18]. **Targeting**
[HM16, HN19]. **Tasks** [AV20]. **Taxes**
[BV19]. **TEAC** [CM17, PS17]. **Team**
[KR18]. **telling** [KS19]. **Terms** [CM17].
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[GNR18, PRU17]. **Theoretic**
[ADH19, IO18, KS19, JP13]. **Theory**
[EG16, JLSW17, FN13]. **Three** [EPR19].
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[GMS15]. **Tractable** [MT13]. **Trade**
[HLPV18]. **Tradeoffs** [RGKK16]. **Traffic**
[CV15, EKM18]. **Transactions**
[BMM18, CM13]. **Transfers** [HKV16].
Truth [CPS16, KS19]. **Truth-telling**

[KS19]. **Truthful**
 [ADH15, BL16, CEK16, CCK⁺16, FB17].
Truthfulness [FZ15, HKV16]. **Two**
 [BFK17, CDD⁺14, CBGdK⁺20, IM15].
Two-Sided [CBGdK⁺20, IM15]. **Types**
 [EPR19].

Uncertainty [BBM13, PNS16].
Unflinchingly [EPR19]. **Unit** [EFRS20].
Universal [BGR14]. **Unknown** [BBDS17].
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 [AMPS20]. **Using** [EPR19]. **Utilities**
 [ASA17]. **Utility** [BGHM19].

Valuation [DHS18]. **Valuations**
 [ABF⁺17, COP18, NS15]. **Value**
 [CCK⁺16, MSR⁺14, WYZ18]. **Values**
 [RTC16]. **VCG** [DHS18, GK17, RS14].
VCG-Based [DHS18]. **Verification** [FZ15].
Versions [GMVY18]. **Very** [AKL19]. **via**
 [ACV13, FS16, HH13]. **Votes**
 [CPS16, KKL19]. **Voting** [GKSA19].

Wait [CCS17]. **Web** [DHW15]. **Weighted**
 [BGR14, CFGS15, GKK20, KR15]. **Welfare**
 [AKS17, CKM⁺19, DHK⁺16, PST14, RSUW20]. **Well** [EPR19].
Whole [DHK⁺16]. **Whole-Page** [DHK⁺16].
WINE'13 [CI15]. **without** [PT13, RS16].
World [KPS18]. **Worst** [BGR14]. **Worst-Case**
 [BGR14].

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Aziz:2019:FHG

[ACV13]

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