Table of contents for issues of ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation

Last update: Sat Dec 23 08:24:19 MST 2017                Valid HTML 3.2!

Volume 1, Number 1, January, 2013
Volume 1, Number 2, May, 2013
Volume 1, Number 3, September, 2013
Volume 1, Number 4, December, 2013
Volume 2, Number 1, March, 2014
Volume 2, Number 2, June, 2014
Volume 2, Number 3, July, 2014
Volume 2, Number 4, October, 2014
Volume 3, Number 1, March, 2015
Volume 3, Number 2, April, 2015
Volume 3, Number 3, June, 2015
Volume 3, Number 4, July, 2015
Volume 4, Number 1, December, 2015
Volume 4, Number 2, February, 2016
Volume 4, Number 3, June, 2016
Volume 4, Number 4, August, 2016
Volume 5, Number 1, November, 2016
Volume 5, Number 2, March, 2017
Volume 5, Number 3, August, 2017
Volume 5, Number 4, December, 2017


ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Volume 1, Number 1, January, 2013

           Vincent Conitzer and   
              R. Preston Mcafee   The ACM Transactions on Economics and
                                  Computation: an introduction . . . . . . 1:1--1:??
             Ronen Gradwohl and   
                 Noam Livne and   
                     Alon Rosen   Sequential rationality in cryptographic
                                  protocols  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2:1--2:??
                Shaili Jain and   
                David C. Parkes   A game-theoretic analysis of the ESP
                                  game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3:1--3:??
         Victor Naroditskiy and   
            Maria Polukarov and   
           Nicholas R. Jennings   Optimal payments in dominant-strategy
                                  mechanisms for single-parameter domains  4:1--4:??

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Volume 1, Number 2, May, 2013

             Michal Feldman and   
                     Noam Nisan   Introduction to the Special Issue on
                                  Algorithmic Game Theory  . . . . . . . . 5:1--5:??
             Lawrence Blume and   
               David Easley and   
              Jon Kleinberg and   
           Robert Kleinberg and   
              Éva Tardos   Network Formation in the Presence of
                                  Contagious Risk  . . . . . . . . . . . . 6:1--6:??
             Anna R. Karlin and   
            C. Thach Nguyen and   
                    Yuval Peres   Selling in Exclusive Markets: Some
                                  Observations on Prior-Free Mechanism
                                  Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7:1--7:??
                 Bach Q. Ha and   
              Jason D. Hartline   Mechanism Design via Consensus
                                  Estimates, Cross Checking, and Profit
                                  Extraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8:1--8:??
           Paul W. Goldberg and   
  Christos H. Papadimitriou and   
                   Rahul Savani   The Complexity of the Homotopy Method,
                                  Equilibrium Selection, and Lemke--Howson
                                  Solutions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9:1--9:??
          Elias Koutsoupias and   
               George Pierrakos   On the Competitive Ratio of Online
                                  Sampling Auctions  . . . . . . . . . . . 10:1--10:??
              Ozan Candogan and   
            Asuman Ozdaglar and   
               Pablo A. Parrilo   Near-Potential Games: Geometry and
                                  Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11:1--11:??
            Jacob Abernethy and   
                Yiling Chen and   
       Jennifer Wortman Vaughan   Efficient Market Making via Convex
                                  Optimization, and a Connection to Online
                                  Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12:1--12:??
             Nima Haghpanah and   
           Nicole Immorlica and   
             Vahab Mirrokni and   
                Kamesh Munagala   Optimal Auctions with Positive Network
                                  Externalities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13:1--13:??

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Volume 1, Number 3, September, 2013

             Abraham Othman and   
           David M. Pennock and   
           Daniel M. Reeves and   
                Tuomas Sandholm   A Practical Liquidity-Sensitive
                                  Automated Market Maker . . . . . . . . . 14:1--14:??
       Maria-Florina Balcan and   
                 Avrim Blum and   
                 Yishay Mansour   The Price of Uncertainty . . . . . . . . 15:1--15:??
      Orna Agmon Ben-Yehuda and   
            Muli Ben-Yehuda and   
             Assaf Schuster and   
                    Dan Tsafrir   Deconstructing Amazon EC2 Spot Instance
                                  Pricing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16:1--16:??
                    David Sarne   Competitive Shopbots-Mediated Markets    17:1--17:??

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Volume 1, Number 4, December, 2013

         Ariel D. Procaccia and   
              Moshe Tennenholtz   Approximate Mechanism Design without
                                  Money  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18:1--18:??
               Ercan Yildiz and   
            Asuman Ozdaglar and   
             Daron Acemoglu and   
                Amin Saberi and   
                 Anna Scaglione   Binary Opinion Dynamics with Stubborn
                                  Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19:1--19:??
            Elchanan Mossel and   
                     Omer Tamuz   Making Consensus Tractable . . . . . . . 20:1--20:??
              Martin Hoefer and   
             Alexander Skopalik   Altruism in Atomic Congestion Games  . . 21:1--21:??


ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Volume 2, Number 1, March, 2014

               Gleb Polevoy and   
           Rann Smorodinsky and   
              Moshe Tennenholtz   Signaling Competition and Social Welfare 1:1--1:??
             Susanne Albers and   
               Stefan Eilts and   
              Eyal Even-Dar and   
             Yishay Mansour and   
                   Liam Roditty   On Nash Equilibria for a Network
                                  Creation Game  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2:1--2:??
             Bart Smeulders and   
       Frits C. R. Spieksma and   
           Laurens Cherchye and   
                   Bram De Rock   Goodness-of-Fit Measures for Revealed
                                  Preference Tests: Complexity Results and
                                  Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3:1--3:??
                   Yu Zhang and   
                 Jaeok Park and   
         Mihaela van der Schaar   Rating Protocols in Online Communities   4:1--4:??

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Volume 2, Number 2, June, 2014

                 Yuval Emek and   
             Michal Feldman and   
                Iftah Gamzu and   
            Renato PaesLeme and   
              Moshe Tennenholtz   Signaling Schemes for Revenue
                                  Maximization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5:1--5:??
                Yiling Chen and   
                Ian A. Kash and   
            Michael Ruberry and   
                Victor Shnayder   Eliciting Predictions and
                                  Recommendations for Decision Making  . . 6:1--6:??
              Rakefet Rozen and   
               Rann Smorodinsky   Ex-Post Equilibrium and VCG Mechanisms   7:1--7:??
                 Xujin Chen and   
             Benjamin Doerr and   
               Carola Doerr and   
                Xiaodong Hu and   
                 Weidong Ma and   
                   Rob van Stee   The Price of Anarchy for Selfish Ring
                                  Routing is Two . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8:1--8:??

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Volume 2, Number 3, July, 2014

               Matthew Cary and   
                 Aparna Das and   
           Benjamin Edelman and   
             Ioannis Giotis and   
             Kurtis Heimerl and   
             Anna R. Karlin and   
        Scott Duke Kominers and   
             Claire Mathieu and   
                Michael Schwarz   Convergence of Position Auctions under
                                  Myopic Best-Response Dynamics  . . . . . 9:1--9:??
          Pablo Daniel Azar and   
                  Silvio Micali   The Query Complexity of Scoring Rules    10:1--10:??
                Saeed Alaei and   
         Azarakhsh Malekian and   
             Aravind Srinivasan   On Random Sampling Auctions for Digital
                                  Goods  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11:1--11:??
            Pranav Dandekar and   
                Nadia Fawaz and   
              Stratis Ioannidis   Privacy Auctions for Recommender Systems 12:1--12:??

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Volume 2, Number 4, October, 2014

       Maria-Florina Balcan and   
              Sara Krehbiel and   
         Georgios Piliouras and   
                    Jinwoo Shin   Near-Optimality in Covering Games by
                                  Exposing Global Information  . . . . . . 13:1--13:??
          Kshipra Bhawalkar and   
             Martin Gairing and   
                Tim Roughgarden   Weighted Congestion Games: The Price of
                                  Anarchy, Universal Worst-Case Examples,
                                  and Tightness  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14:1--14:??
           Dimitris Fotakis and   
                Christos Tzamos   On the Power of Deterministic Mechanisms
                                  for Facility Location Games  . . . . . . 15:1--15:??
         Tomasz P. Michalak and   
     Piotr L. Szczepa\'nski and   
               Talal Rahwan and   
              Agata Chrobak and   
       Simina Brânzei and   
         Michael Wooldridge and   
           Nicholas R. Jennings   Implementation and Computation of a
                                  Value for Generalized Characteristic
                                  Function Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16:1--16:??
                 Po-An Chen and   
            Bart De Keijzer and   
                David Kempe and   
             Guido Schäfer   Altruism and Its Impact on the Price of
                                  Anarchy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17:1--17:??


ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Volume 3, Number 1, March, 2015

         Kevin Leyton-Brown and   
                Panos Ipeirotis   Introduction to the Special Issue on
                                  EC'12  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1:1--1:??
        Ioannis Caragiannis and   
             Angelo Fanelli and   
                Nick Gravin and   
             Alexander Skopalik   Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in
                                  Weighted Congestion Games: Existence,
                                  Efficient Computation, and Structure . . 2:1--2:??
            David C. Parkes and   
         Ariel D. Procaccia and   
                    Nisarg Shah   Beyond Dominant Resource Fairness:
                                  Extensions, Limitations, and
                                  Indivisibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . 3:1--3:??
             Moshe Babaioff and   
             Shaddin Dughmi and   
           Robert Kleinberg and   
            Aleksandrs Slivkins   Dynamic Pricing with Limited Supply  . . 4:1--4:??
          Paul Dütting and   
              Felix Fischer and   
         Pichayut Jirapinyo and   
                John K. Lai and   
             Benjamin Lubin and   
                David C. Parkes   Payment Rules through Discriminant-Based
                                  Classifiers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5:1--5:??
                Tim Roughgarden   The Price of Anarchy in Games of
                                  Incomplete Information . . . . . . . . . 6:1--6:??

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Volume 3, Number 2, April, 2015

        Daniel G. Goldstein and   
          R. Preston McAfee and   
                 Siddharth Suri   Improving the Effectiveness of
                                  Time-Based Display Advertising . . . . . 7:1--7:??
              Sam Ganzfried and   
                Tuomas Sandholm   Safe Opponent Exploitation . . . . . . . 8:1--8:??
              Martin Hoefer and   
              Thomas Kesselheim   Secondary Spectrum Auctions for
                                  Symmetric and Submodular Bidders . . . . 9:1--9:??
     Christopher A. Wilkens and   
          Balasubramanian Sivan   Single-Call Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . 10:1--10:??
       Deepayan Chakrabarti and   
                       Erik Vee   Traffic Shaping to Optimize Ad Delivery  11:1--11:??
               Arpita Ghosh and   
           Mohammad Mahdian and   
          R. Preston McAfee and   
           Sergei Vassilvitskii   To Match or Not to Match: Economics of
                                  Cookie Matching in Online Advertising    12:1--12:??

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Volume 3, Number 3, June, 2015

                Ian A. Kash and   
           Eric J. Friedman and   
              Joseph Y. Halpern   An Equilibrium Analysis of Scrip Systems 13:1--13:??
           Nicole Immorlica and   
               Mohammad Mahdian   Incentives in Large Random Two-Sided
                                  Markets  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14:1--14:??
           Ruggiero Cavallo and   
          R. Preston Mcafee and   
           Sergei Vassilvitskii   Display Advertising Auctions with
                                  Arbitrage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15:1--15:??
              Davide Bil\`o and   
            Luciano Gual\`a and   
                 Guido Proietti   Bounded-Distance Network Creation Games  16:1--16:??

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Volume 3, Number 4, July, 2015

                Yiling Chen and   
               Nicole Immorlica   Introduction to the Special Issue on
                                  WINE'13  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17:1--17:??
     Mohammadhossein Bateni and   
             Nima Haghpanah and   
      Balasubramanian Sivan and   
          Morteza Zadimoghaddam   Revenue Maximization with Nonexcludable
                                  Goods  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18:1--18:??
               Hadi Minooei and   
                Chaitanya Swamy   Near-Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design
                                  for Covering Problems with Correlated
                                  Players  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19:1--19:??
           Dimitris Fotakis and   
           Emmanouil Zampetakis   Truthfulness Flooded Domains and the
                                  Power of Verification for Mechanism
                                  Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20:1--20:??
       Konstantinos Kollias and   
                Tim Roughgarden   Restoring Pure Equilibria to Weighted
                                  Congestion Games . . . . . . . . . . . . 21:1--21:??
           Yakov Babichenko and   
               Siddharth Barman   Query Complexity of Correlated
                                  Equilibrium  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22:1--22:??
             Yonatan Aumann and   
                     Yair Dombb   The Efficiency of Fair Division with
                                  Connected Pieces . . . . . . . . . . . . 23:1--23:??
            Stanko Dimitrov and   
                 Rahul Sami and   
              Marina A. Epelman   Subsidized Prediction Mechanisms for
                                  Risk-Averse Agents . . . . . . . . . . . 24:1--24:??
             Yuanzhang Xiao and   
         Mihaela Van Der Schaar   Socially-Optimal Design of Service
                                  Exchange Platforms with Imperfect
                                  Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25:1--25:??
              Swaprava Nath and   
                    Arunava Sen   Affine Maximizers in Domains with
                                  Selfish Valuations . . . . . . . . . . . 26:1--26:??


ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Volume 4, Number 1, December, 2015

          Paul Dütting and   
           Monika Henzinger and   
                   Ingmar Weber   An Expressive Mechanism for Auctions on
                                  the Web  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1:1--1:??
  Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi and   
           Stefano Leonardi and   
           Monika Henzinger and   
             Martin Starnberger   On Multiple Keyword Sponsored Search
                                  Auctions with Budgets  . . . . . . . . . 2:1--2:??
             Yonatan Aumann and   
                 Yair Dombb and   
              Avinatan Hassidim   Auctioning Time: Truthful Auctions of
                                  Heterogeneous Divisible Goods  . . . . . 3:1--3:??
          Paul Dütting and   
           Monika Henzinger and   
             Martin Starnberger   Auctions for Heterogeneous Items and
                                  Budget Limits  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4:1--4:??
                  Noga Alon and   
           Robert Bredereck and   
                Jiehua Chen and   
             Stefan Kratsch and   
           Rolf Niedermeier and   
           Gerhard J. Woeginger   How to Put Through Your Agenda in
                                  Collective Binary Decisions  . . . . . . 5:1--5:??
         Daniel Fragiadakis and   
            Atsushi Iwasaki and   
               Peter Troyan and   
                Suguru Ueda and   
                   Makoto Yokoo   Strategyproof Matching with Minimum
                                  Quotas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6:1--6:??

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Volume 4, Number 2, February, 2016

             Moshe Babaioff and   
              Moran Feldman and   
              Moshe Tennenholtz   Mechanism Design with Strategic
                                  Mediators  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7:1--7:??
            Tim Roughgarden and   
                Okke Schrijvers   Network Cost-Sharing without Anonymity   8:1--8:??
       George Christodoulou and   
Annamária Kovács and   
          Alkmini Sgouritsa and   
                        Bo Tang   Tight Bounds for the Price of Anarchy of
                                  Simultaneous First-Price Auctions  . . . 9:1--9:??
       George Christodoulou and   
                 Martin Gairing   Price of Stability in Polynomial
                                  Congestion Games . . . . . . . . . . . . 10:1--10:??
              Martin Hoefer and   
          Thomas Kesselheim and   
          Berthold Vöcking   Truthfulness and Stochastic Dominance
                                  with Monetary Transfers  . . . . . . . . 11:1--11:??

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Volume 4, Number 3, June, 2016

             Preston Mcafee and   
              Éva Tardos   Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12:1--12:??
                Yiling Chen and   
              Stephen Chong and   
                Ian A. Kash and   
                  Tal Moran and   
                   Salil Vadhan   Truthful Mechanisms for Agents That
                                  Value Privacy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13:1--13:??
          Nikhil R. Devanur and   
                Zhiyi Huang and   
              Nitish Korula and   
          Vahab S. Mirrokni and   
                       Qiqi Yan   Whole-Page Optimization and Submodular
                                  Welfare Maximization with Online Bidders 14:1--14:??
        Ioannis Caragiannis and   
         Ariel D. Procaccia and   
                    Nisarg Shah   When Do Noisy Votes Reveal the Truth?    15:1--15:??
               David Easley and   
                   Arpita Ghosh   Incentives, Gamification, and Game
                                  Theory: an Economic Approach to Badge
                                  Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16:1--16:??
                Ben Roberts and   
          Dinan Gunawardena and   
                Ian A. Kash and   
                      Peter Key   Ranking and Tradeoffs in Sponsored
                                  Search Auctions  . . . . . . . . . . . . 17:1--17:??
            Tim Roughgarden and   
             Inbal Talgam-Cohen   Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design with
                                  Interdependent Values  . . . . . . . . . 18:1--18:??

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Volume 4, Number 4, August, 2016

           Vincent Conitzer and   
                   David Easley   Introduction to the Special Issue on
                                  EC'14  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19:1--19:??
             Abraham Othman and   
     Christos Papadimitriou and   
               Aviad Rubinstein   The Complexity of Fairness Through
                                  Equilibrium  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20:1--20:??
          Avinatan Hassidim and   
             Yishay Mansour and   
                     Shai Vardi   Local Computation Mechanism Design . . . 21:1--21:??
               Arpita Ghosh and   
               Robert Kleinberg   Optimal Contest Design for Simple Agents 22:1--22:??
             Drew Fudenberg and   
         Alexander Peysakhovich   Recency, Records, and Recaps: Learning
                                  and Nonequilibrium Behavior in a Simple
                                  Decision Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . 23:1--23:??
           Paul W. Goldberg and   
                     Aaron Roth   Bounds for the Query Complexity of
                                  Approximate Equilibria . . . . . . . . . 24:1--24:??
              John Fearnley and   
                   Rahul Savani   Finding Approximate Nash Equilibria of
                                  Bimatrix Games via Payoff Queries  . . . 25:1--25:??


ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Volume 5, Number 1, November, 2016

          Avinatan Hassidim and   
                Haim Kaplan and   
             Yishay Mansour and   
                     Noam Nisan   The AND--OR Game . . . . . . . . . . . . 1:1--1:??
              Allan Borodin and   
                 Brendan Lucier   On the Limitations of Greedy Mechanism
                                  Design for Truthful Combinatorial
                                  Auctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2:1--2:??
               Tobias Harks and   
       Philipp Von Falkenhausen   Robust Quantitative Comparative Statics
                                  for a Multimarket Paradox  . . . . . . . 3:1--3:??
             Patrick Hummel and   
              R. Preston Mcafee   When Does Improved Targeting Increase
                                  Revenue? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4:1--4:??
         Georgios Piliouras and   
           Evdokia Nikolova and   
                 Jeff S. Shamma   Risk Sensitivity of Price of Anarchy
                                  under Uncertainty  . . . . . . . . . . . 5:1--5:??
          Nikhil R. Devanur and   
                 Jugal Garg and   
László A. Végh   A Rational Convex Program for Linear
                                  Arrow--Debreu Markets  . . . . . . . . . 6:1--6:??
               Chi-Kin Chau and   
          Khaled Elbassioni and   
                   Majid Khonji   Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial
                                  Allocation of Electric Power in
                                  Alternating Current Electric Systems for
                                  Smart Grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7:1--7:??
             Michal Feldman and   
                      Ofir Geri   Do Capacity Constraints Constrain
                                  Coalitions?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8:1--8:??

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Volume 5, Number 2, March, 2017

               Felix Brandt and   
                   Markus Brill   Computing Dominance-Based Solution
                                  Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9:1--9:??
           Vincent Conitzer and   
                 Preston McAfee   Farewell Editorial: Looking Back on Our
                                  Terms Editing ACM TEAC and into the
                                  Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9:1--9:??
              David Pennock and   
                     Ilya Segal   Editorial from the New TEAC
                                  Co-Editors-in-Chief  . . . . . . . . . . 9:1--9:??
             Mallesh M. Pai and   
                 Aaron Roth and   
                Jonathan Ullman   An Antifolk Theorem for Large Repeated
                                  Games  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10:1--10:??
                Amos Azaria and   
                David Sarne and   
                 Yonatan Aumann   Distributed Matching with Mixed
                                  Maximum--Minimum Utilities . . . . . . . 11:1--11:??
                   Hau Chan and   
                  Jing Chen and   
             Gowtham Srinivasan   Provision-After-Wait with Common
                                  Preferences  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12:1--12:??
             Moshe Babaioff and   
             Liad Blumrosen and   
             Shaddin Dughmi and   
                   Yaron Singer   Posting Prices with Unknown
                                  Distributions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13:1--13:??

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Volume 5, Number 3, August, 2017

              Salman Fadaei and   
                 Martin Bichler   A Truthful Mechanism for the Generalized
                                  Assignment Problem . . . . . . . . . . . 14:1--14:??
           Aaron D. Jaggard and   
                  Neil Lutz and   
           Michael Schapira and   
              Rebecca N. Wright   Dynamics at the Boundary of Game Theory
                                  and Distributed Computing  . . . . . . . 15:1--15:??
         Elliot Anshelevich and   
                Koushik Kar and   
                  Shreyas Sekar   Envy-Free Pricing in Large Markets:
                                  Approximating Revenue and Welfare  . . . 16:1--16:??
           Rafael Frongillo and   
                 Jens Witkowski   A Geometric Perspective on Minimal Peer
                                  Prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17:1--17:??

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Volume 5, Number 4, December, 2017

               Richard Cole and   
                    Shravas Rao   Applications of $ \alpha $-Strongly
                                  Regular Distributions to Bayesian
                                  Auctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18:1--18:??
     Yiannis Giannakopoulos and   
               Maria Kyropoulou   The VCG Mechanism for Bayesian
                                  Scheduling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19:1--19:??
              Sepehr Assadi and   
             Sanjeev Khanna and   
                    Yang Li and   
                   Rakesh Vohra   Fast Convergence in the Double Oral
                                  Auction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20:1--20:??
               Antje Bjelde and   
              Felix Fischer and   
                      Max Klimm   Impartial Selection and the Power of Up
                                  to Two Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21:1--21:??
             Marek Adamczyk and   
              Allan Borodin and   
          Diodato Ferraioli and   
            Bart De Keijzer and   
               Stefano Leonardi   Sequential Posted-Price Mechanisms with
                                  Correlated Valuations  . . . . . . . . . 22:1--22:??
  Branislav Bosanský and   
       Simina Brânzei and   
 Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen and   
         Troels Bjerre Lund and   
            Peter Bro Miltersen   Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of
                                  Finite Sequential Games  . . . . . . . . 23:1--23:??