Title word cross-reference

α [CR17].

-Strongly [CR17].

ACM [CM13, CM17]. Ad [CV15].
Advertising [CMV15, GMMV15, GMS15].
Affine [NS15]. After [CCS17]. Agenda [ABC+15]. Agents [CCK+16, DSE15, GK16, YOA+13].
Algorithmic [FN13]. Algorithms [SSCD14]. Allocation [CEK16].
Alternating [CEK16]. Altruism [CDKS14, HS13]. Amazon [BYBST13].
Antifolk [PRU17]. Applications [CR17].
Approach [EG16]. Approximate [CFGs15, FS16, GR16, PT13].
Automated [OPRS13]. Averse [DSE15].

Beyond [PPS15]. Bidders


cryptographic [GLR13]. Current [CEK16].

Debreu [DV16]. Decision [CRSS14, FP16]. Decisions [ABC+15].


Digital [AMS14]. Discriminant [DFJ+15]. Discriminant-Based [DFJ+15]. Display [CMV15, GMS15]. Distance [BGP15].

Distributed [AS17, JLSW17].


Future [CM17].


Games [BKPS14, BGR14, BGP15, BBH+17, COP13, CFGS15, CG16, FS16, FT14, HS13, KR15, MSR+14, PRU17, Rou15].
Gamification [EG16]. Generalized [FB17, MSR+14]. Geometric [FW17].
Geometry [COP13]. Global [BKPS14].
Grid [CEK16].

Heterogeneous [ADH15, DHS15].
Homotopy [GPS13]. Howson [GPS13].

Impact [CDKS14]. Impartial [BFK17].
Imperfect [KV15]. Implementation [MSR+14]. Improved [HM16]. Improving [GMS15]. Incentives [EG16, IM15].
Incomplete [Rou15]. Increase [HM16].

Indivisibilities [PPS15]. Information [BKPS14, Rou15]. Instance [BYBYST13].
Interdependent [RTC16]. Introduction [CI15, CE16, FN13, LBI15, MT16, CM13].
Issue [CI15, CE16, FN13, LBI15]. Items [DHS15].

Keyword [CBLHS15].

Large [AKS17, IM15, PRU17]. Learning [ACV13, FP16]. Lemke [GPS13].
Limitations [BL16, PPS15]. Limited [BDKS15]. Limits [DHS15]. Linear [DG14].
Liquidity [OPRS13].
Liquidity-Sensitive [OPRS13]. Local [HMV16]. Location [FT14]. Looking [CM17].

Match [GMMV15]. Matching [ASA17, FIT+15, GMMV15].

Mechanisms [ABF+17, CEK16, CCK+16, DSE15, FT14, RS14, WS15, NP1J13].

Nash [AEED+14, CFGS15, FS16]. Near [BKPS14, COP13, MS15]. Near-Optimal [MS15]. Near-Optimality [BKPS14].

Observations [KNP13]. Online [ACV13, DHK+16, GMMV15, KP13, ZPvdS14].
Opinion [YOA+13]. Opponent [GS15].
Optimal [GK16, HIMM13, MS15, NP1J13, RTC16, XV15]. Optimality [BKPS14].
Optimization [ACV13, DHK+16].
Optimize [CV15]. Oral [AKLV17]. Our [CM17].

Page [DHK+16]. Paradox [HV16].
parameter [NP1J13]. Payment [DFJ+15].
Prices \cite{BBDS17}. Pricing \cite{AKS17, BDKS15, BYBYST13}. Prior \cite{KNP13}. Prior-Free \cite{KNP13}. Privacy \cite{CCK+16, DFI14}. Problem \cite{FB17, FP16}. Problems \cite{MS15}. Profit \cite{HH13}. Program \cite{DGV16}. Protocols \cite{ZPvdS14, GLR13}. Provision \cite{CCS17}. Provision-After-Wait \cite{CCS17}. Pure \cite{CFGS15, KR15}. Put \cite{ABC+15}.

Quantitative \cite{HV16}. Queries \cite{FS16}. Query \cite{AM14, BB15, GR16}. Quotas \cite{FIT+15}.

Random \cite{AMS14, IM15}. Ranking \cite{RGKK16}. Rating \cite{ZPvdS14}. Ratio \cite{KP13}. Rational \cite{DGV16}. rationality \cite{GLR13}. Recaps \cite{FP16}. Recency \cite{FP16}.

Recommender \cite{DFI14}. Records \cite{FP16}. Regular \cite{CR17}. Repeated \cite{PRU17}. Resource \cite{PPS15}. Response \cite{CDE+14}. Restoring \cite{KR15}. Results \cite{SSCD14}. Reveal \cite{CPS16}. Revealed \cite{SSCD14}.

Revenue \cite{AKS17, BHSZ15, EFG+14, HM16}. Ring \cite{CDD+14}. Risk \cite{BEK+13, DSE15, PNS16}. Risk-Averse \cite{DSE15}. Robust \cite{HV16, MS15, RTC16}. Routing \cite{CDD+14}. Rules \cite{AM14, DFJ+15}.

Safe \cite{GS15}. Sampling \cite{AMS14, KP13}. Scheduling \cite{GK17}. Schemes \cite{EFG+14}. Scoring \cite{AM14}. Scrip \cite{KFH15}. Search \cite{CBLHS15, RGKK16}. Secondary \cite{HK15}. Selection \cite{BFK17, GPS13}. Selfish \cite{CDD+14, NS15}. Selling \cite{KNP13}. Sensitive \cite{OPRS13}. Sensitivity \cite{PNS16}. Sequential \cite{ABF+17, BBH+17, GLR13}. Service \cite{XV15}. Shaping \cite{CV15}. Sharing \cite{RS16}. Shopbots \cite{Sar13}. Shopbots-Mediated \cite{Sar13}. Sided \cite{IM15}.

Signaling \cite{EFG+14, PST14}. Simple \cite{FP16, GK16}. Simultaneous \cite{CKST16}. Single \cite{WS15, NPJ13}. Single-Call \cite{WS15}. single-parameter \cite{NPJ13}. Smart \cite{CEK16}. Social \cite{PST14}. Socially \cite{XV15}. Socially-Optimal \cite{XV15}. Solution \cite{BB17}. Solutions \cite{GPS13}. Some \cite{KNP13}. Special \cite{CI15, CE16, LBI15, FN13}. Spectrum \cite{HK15}. Sponsored \cite{CBLHS15, RGKK16}. Spot \cite{BYBYST13}. Stability \cite{CG16}. Stackelberg \cite{BBH+17}. Statics \cite{HV16}. Stochastic \cite{HKV16}. Strategic \cite{BFT16}. strategy \cite{NPJ13}. Strategyproof \cite{FIT+15}. Strongly \cite{CR17}. Structure \cite{CFGS15}. Stubborn \cite{YOA+13}. Submodular \cite{DHK+16, HK15}. Subsidized \cite{DSE15}. Supply \cite{BDKS15}. Symmetric \cite{HK15}. Systems \cite{CEK16, DFI14, KFH15}.

Targeting \cite{HM16}. TEAC \cite{CM17, PS17}. Terms \cite{CM17}. Tests \cite{SSCD14}. Theorem \cite{PRU17}. theoretic \cite{JP13}. Theory \cite{EG16, JLSW17, FN13}. Tight \cite{CKST16}. Tightness \cite{BGR14}. Time \cite{ADH15, GMS15}. Time-Based \cite{GMS15}. Tradeoffs \cite{RGKK16}. Traffic \cite{CV15}. Transactions \cite{CM13}. Transfers \cite{HKV16}. Truth \cite{CS16}. Truthful \cite{ADH15, BL16, CEK16, CCK+16, FB17}. Truthfulness \cite{FZ15, HKV16}. Two \cite{BFK17, CDD+14, IM15}. Two-Sided \cite{IM15}.

Uncertainty \cite{BBM13, PNS16}. Universal \cite{BGR14}. Unknown \cite{BBDS17}. Utilities \cite{ASA17}.

Valuations \cite{ABF+17, NS15}. Value \cite{CCK+16, MSR+14}. Values \cite{RTC16}. VCG \cite{GK17, RS14}. Verification \cite{FZ15}. via \cite{ACV13, FS16, HH13}. Votes \cite{CPS16}.
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**Brandt:2017:CDB**


**Babaioff:2017:PPU**


**Bosansky:2017:CSE**

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