Entry Awerbuch:2008:ODS from tissec.bib

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BibTeX entry

@Article{Awerbuch:2008:ODS,
  author =       "Baruch Awerbuch and Reza Curtmola and David Holmer and
                 Cristina Nita-Rotaru and Herbert Rubens",
  title =        "{ODSBR}: an on-demand secure {Byzantine} resilient
                 routing protocol for wireless ad hoc networks",
  journal =      j-TISSEC,
  volume =       "10",
  number =       "4",
  pages =        "6:1--6:??",
  month =        jan,
  year =         "2008",
  CODEN =        "ATISBQ",
  DOI =          "https://doi.org/10.1145/1284680.1341892",
  ISSN =         "1094-9224 (print), 1557-7406 (electronic)",
  ISSN-L =       "1094-9224",
  bibdate =      "Thu Jun 12 17:52:24 MDT 2008",
  bibsource =    "http://portal.acm.org/;
                 http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/tissec.bib",
  abstract =     "Ah hoc networks offer increased coverage by using
                 multihop communication. This architecture makes
                 services more vulnerable to internal attacks coming
                 from compromised nodes that behave arbitrarily to
                 disrupt the network, also referred to as Byzantine
                 attacks. In this work, we examine the impact of several
                 Byzantine attacks performed by individual or colluding
                 attackers. We propose ODSBR, the first on-demand
                 routing protocol for ad hoc wireless networks that
                 provides resilience to Byzantine attacks caused by
                 individual or colluding nodes. The protocol uses an
                 adaptive probing technique that detects a malicious
                 link after log n faults have occurred, where n is the
                 length of the path. Problematic links are avoided by
                 using a route discovery mechanism that relies on a new
                 metric that captures adversarial behavior. Our protocol
                 never partitions the network and bounds the amount of
                 damage caused by attackers. We demonstrate through
                 simulations ODSBR's effectiveness in mitigating
                 Byzantine attacks. Our analysis of the impact of these
                 attacks versus the adversary's effort gives insights
                 into their relative strengths, their interaction, and
                 their importance when designing multihop wireless
                 routing protocols.",
  acknowledgement = ack-nhfb,
  articleno =    "6",
  fjournal =     "ACM Transactions on Information and System Security",
  journal-URL =  "http://portal.acm.org/browse_dl.cfm?idx=J789",
  keywords =     "ad hoc wireless networks; Byzantine failures;
                 on-demand routing; security",
}

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