Entry Tan:2015:IAR from tissec.bib

Last update: Sun Oct 15 02:58:48 MDT 2017                Valid HTML 3.2!

Index sections

Top | Symbols | Numbers | Math | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z

BibTeX entry

@Article{Tan:2015:IAR,
  author =       "Rui Tan and Varun Badrinath Krishna and David K. Y.
                 Yau and Zbigniew Kalbarczyk",
  title =        "Integrity Attacks on Real-Time Pricing in Electric
                 Power Grids",
  journal =      j-TISSEC,
  volume =       "18",
  number =       "2",
  pages =        "5:1--5:??",
  month =        dec,
  year =         "2015",
  CODEN =        "ATISBQ",
  DOI =          "https://doi.org/10.1145/2790298",
  ISSN =         "1094-9224 (print), 1557-7406 (electronic)",
  ISSN-L =       "1094-9224",
  bibdate =      "Mon Dec 21 18:18:49 MST 2015",
  bibsource =    "http://portal.acm.org/;
                 http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/tissec.bib",
  abstract =     "Modern information and communication technologies used
                 by electric power grids are subject to cyber-security
                 threats. This article studies the impact of integrity
                 attacks on real-time pricing (RTP), an emerging feature
                 of advanced power grids that can improve system
                 efficiency. Recent studies have shown that RTP creates
                 a closed loop formed by the mutually dependent
                 real-time price signals and price-taking demand. Such a
                 closed loop can be exploited by an adversary whose
                 objective is to destabilize the pricing system.
                 Specifically, small malicious modifications to the
                 price signals can be iteratively amplified by the
                 closed loop, causing highly volatile prices,
                 fluctuating power demand, and increased system
                 operating cost. This article adopts a control-theoretic
                 approach to deriving the fundamental conditions of RTP
                 stability under basic demand, supply, and RTP models
                 that characterize the essential behaviors of consumers,
                 suppliers, and system operators, as well as two broad
                 classes of integrity attacks, namely, the scaling and
                 delay attacks. We show that, under an approximated
                 linear time-invariant formulation, the RTP system is at
                 risk of being destabilized only if the adversary can
                 compromise the price signals advertised to consumers,
                 by either reducing their values in the scaling attack
                 or providing old prices to over half of all consumers
                 in the delay attack. The results provide useful
                 guidelines for system operators to analyze the impact
                 of various attack parameters on system stability so
                 that they may take adequate measures to secure RTP
                 systems.",
  acknowledgement = ack-nhfb,
  articleno =    "5",
  fjournal =     "ACM Transactions on Information and System Security",
  journal-URL =  "http://portal.acm.org/browse_dl.cfm?idx=J789",
}

Related entries