Entry Liu:2008:ARL from tissec.bib

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BibTeX entry

@Article{Liu:2008:ARL,
  author =       "Donggang Liu and Peng Ning and An Liu and Cliff Wang
                 and Wenliang Kevin Du",
  title =        "Attack-Resistant Location Estimation in Wireless
                 Sensor Networks",
  journal =      j-TISSEC,
  volume =       "11",
  number =       "4",
  pages =        "22:1--22:??",
  month =        jul,
  year =         "2008",
  CODEN =        "ATISBQ",
  DOI =          "https://doi.org/10.1145/1380564.1380570",
  ISSN =         "1094-9224 (print), 1557-7406 (electronic)",
  ISSN-L =       "1094-9224",
  bibdate =      "Tue Aug 5 19:37:22 MDT 2008",
  bibsource =    "http://portal.acm.org/;
                 http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/tissec.bib",
  abstract =     "Many sensor network applications require sensors'
                 locations to function correctly. Despite the recent
                 advances, location discovery for sensor networks in
                 {\em hostile environments\/} has been mostly
                 overlooked. Most of the existing localization protocols
                 for sensor networks are vulnerable in hostile
                 environments. The security of location discovery can
                 certainly be enhanced by authentication. However, the
                 possible node compromises and the fact that location
                 determination uses certain physical features (e.g.,
                 received signal strength) of radio signals make
                 authentication not as effective as in traditional
                 security applications. This article presents two
                 methods to tolerate malicious attacks against
                 range-based location discovery in sensor networks. The
                 first method filters out malicious beacon signals on
                 the basis of the ``consistency'' among multiple beacon
                 signals, while the second method tolerates malicious
                 beacon signals by adopting an iteratively refined
                 voting scheme. Both methods can survive malicious
                 attacks even if the attacks bypass authentication,
                 provided that the benign beacon signals constitute the
                 majority of the beacon signals. This article also
                 presents the implementation and experimental evaluation
                 (through both field experiments and simulation) of all
                 the secure and resilient location estimation schemes
                 that can be used on the current generation of sensor
                 platforms (e.g., MICA series of motes), including the
                 techniques proposed in this article, in a network of
                 MICAz motes. The experimental results demonstrate the
                 effectiveness of the proposed methods, and also give
                 the secure and resilient location estimation scheme
                 most suitable for the current generation of sensor
                 networks.",
  acknowledgement = ack-nhfb,
  articleno =    "22",
  fjournal =     "ACM Transactions on Information and System Security",
  journal-URL =  "http://portal.acm.org/browse_dl.cfm?idx=J789",
  keywords =     "localization; security; sensor networks",
}

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