Entry Basin:2014:KYE from tissec.bib

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BibTeX entry

@Article{Basin:2014:KYE,
  author =       "David Basin and Cas Cremers",
  title =        "Know Your Enemy: Compromising Adversaries in Protocol
                 Analysis",
  journal =      j-TISSEC,
  volume =       "17",
  number =       "2",
  pages =        "7:1--7:??",
  month =        nov,
  year =         "2014",
  CODEN =        "ATISBQ",
  DOI =          "https://doi.org/10.1145/2658996",
  ISSN =         "1094-9224 (print), 1557-7406 (electronic)",
  ISSN-L =       "1094-9224",
  bibdate =      "Wed Nov 19 12:26:42 MST 2014",
  bibsource =    "http://portal.acm.org/;
                 http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/cryptography2010.bib;
                 http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/tissec.bib",
  abstract =     "We present a symbolic framework, based on a modular
                 operational semantics, for formalizing different
                 notions of compromise relevant for the design and
                 analysis of cryptographic protocols. The framework's
                 rules can be combined to specify different adversary
                 capabilities, capturing different practically-relevant
                 notions of key and state compromise. The resulting
                 adversary models generalize the models currently used
                 in different domains, such as security models for
                 authenticated key exchange. We extend an existing
                 security-protocol analysis tool, Scyther, with our
                 adversary models. This extension systematically
                 supports notions such as weak perfect forward secrecy,
                 key compromise impersonation, and adversaries capable
                 of state-reveal queries. Furthermore, we introduce the
                 concept of a protocol-security hierarchy, which
                 classifies the relative strength of protocols against
                 different adversaries. In case studies, we use Scyther
                 to analyse protocols and automatically construct
                 protocol-security hierarchies in the context of our
                 adversary models. Our analysis confirms known results
                 and uncovers new attacks. Additionally, our hierarchies
                 refine and correct relationships between protocols
                 previously reported in the cryptographic literature.",
  acknowledgement = ack-nhfb,
  articleno =    "7",
  fjournal =     "ACM Transactions on Information and System Security",
  journal-URL =  "http://portal.acm.org/browse_dl.cfm?idx=J789",
}

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