Entry Feigenbaum:2012:PAO from tissec.bib

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BibTeX entry

@Article{Feigenbaum:2012:PAO,
  author =       "Joan Feigenbaum and Aaron Johnson and Paul Syverson",
  title =        "Probabilistic analysis of onion routing in a black-box
                 model",
  journal =      j-TISSEC,
  volume =       "15",
  number =       "3",
  pages =        "14:1--14:??",
  month =        nov,
  year =         "2012",
  CODEN =        "ATISBQ",
  DOI =          "https://doi.org/10.1145/2382448.2382452",
  ISSN =         "1094-9224 (print), 1557-7406 (electronic)",
  ISSN-L =       "1094-9224",
  bibdate =      "Wed Nov 28 17:25:14 MST 2012",
  bibsource =    "http://portal.acm.org/;
                 http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/tissec.bib",
  abstract =     "We perform a probabilistic analysis of onion routing.
                 The analysis is presented in a black-box model of
                 anonymous communication in the Universally Composable
                 (UC) framework that abstracts the essential properties
                 of onion routing in the presence of an active adversary
                 who controls a portion of the network and knows all a
                 priori distributions on user choices of destination.
                 Our results quantify how much the adversary can gain in
                 identifying users by exploiting knowledge of their
                 probabilistic behavior. In particular, we show that, in
                 the limit as the network gets large, a user u's
                 anonymity is worst either when the other users always
                 choose the destination u is least likely to visit or
                 when the other users always choose the destination u
                 chooses. This worst-case anonymity with an adversary
                 that controls a fraction b of the routers is shown to
                 be comparable to the best-case anonymity against an
                 adversary that controls a fraction $\sqrt b$.",
  acknowledgement = ack-nhfb,
  articleno =    "14",
  fjournal =     "ACM Transactions on Information and System Security",
  journal-URL =  "http://portal.acm.org/browse_dl.cfm?idx=J789",
}

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