Entry Chong:2015:UAR from tissec.bib

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BibTeX entry

@Article{Chong:2015:UAR,
  author =       "Stephen Chong and Ron {Van Der Meyden}",
  title =        "Using Architecture to Reason about Information
                 Security",
  journal =      j-TISSEC,
  volume =       "18",
  number =       "2",
  pages =        "8:1--8:??",
  month =        dec,
  year =         "2015",
  CODEN =        "ATISBQ",
  DOI =          "https://doi.org/10.1145/2829949",
  ISSN =         "1094-9224 (print), 1557-7406 (electronic)",
  ISSN-L =       "1094-9224",
  bibdate =      "Mon Dec 21 18:18:49 MST 2015",
  bibsource =    "http://portal.acm.org/;
                 http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/tissec.bib",
  abstract =     "We demonstrate, by a number of examples, that
                 information flow security properties can be proved from
                 abstract architectural descriptions, which describe
                 only the causal structure of a system and local
                 properties of trusted components. We specify these
                 architectural descriptions of systems by generalizing
                 intransitive noninterference policies to admit the
                 ability to filter information passed between
                 communicating domains. A notion of refinement of such
                 system architectures is developed that supports
                 top-down development of architectural specifications
                 and proofs by abstraction of information security
                 properties. We also show that, in a concrete setting
                 where the causal structure is enforced by access
                 control, a static check of the access control setting
                 plus local verification of the trusted components is
                 sufficient to prove that a generalized intransitive
                 noninterference policy is satisfied.",
  acknowledgement = ack-nhfb,
  articleno =    "8",
  fjournal =     "ACM Transactions on Information and System Security",
  journal-URL =  "http://portal.acm.org/browse_dl.cfm?idx=J789",
}

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