Entry Yao:2008:PIR from tissec.bib

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BibTeX entry

@Article{Yao:2008:PIR,
  author =       "Danfeng Yao and Keith B. Frikken and Mikhail J.
                 Atallah and Roberto Tamassia",
  title =        "Private Information: To Reveal or not to Reveal",
  journal =      j-TISSEC,
  volume =       "12",
  number =       "1",
  pages =        "6:1--6:??",
  month =        oct,
  year =         "2008",
  CODEN =        "ATISBQ",
  DOI =          "https://doi.org/10.1145/1410234.1410240",
  ISSN =         "1094-9224 (print), 1557-7406 (electronic)",
  ISSN-L =       "1094-9224",
  bibdate =      "Tue Nov 11 15:54:06 MST 2008",
  bibsource =    "http://portal.acm.org/;
                 http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/tissec.bib",
  abstract =     "This article studies the notion of quantitative
                 policies for trust management and gives protocols for
                 realizing them in a disclosure-minimizing fashion.
                 Specifically, Bob values each credential with a certain
                 number of points, and requires a minimum total
                 threshold of points before granting Alice access to a
                 resource. In turn, Alice values each of her credentials
                 with a privacy score that indicates her degree of
                 reluctance to reveal that credential. Bob's valuation
                 of credentials and his threshold are private. Alice's
                 privacy-valuation of her credentials is also private.
                 Alice wants to find a subset of her credentials that
                 achieves Bob's required threshold for access, yet is of
                 as small a value to her as possible. We give protocols
                 for computing such a subset of Alice's credentials
                 without revealing any of the two parties'
                 above-mentioned private information. Furthermore, we
                 develop a fingerprint method that allows Alice to
                 independently and easily recover the optimal knapsack
                 solution, once the computed optimal value is given, but
                 also enables verification of the integrity of the
                 optimal value. The fingerprint method is useful beyond
                 the specific authorization problem studied, and can be
                 applied to any integer knapsack dynamic programming in
                 a private setting.",
  acknowledgement = ack-nhfb,
  articleno =    "6",
  fjournal =     "ACM Transactions on Information and System Security",
  journal-URL =  "http://portal.acm.org/browse_dl.cfm?idx=J789",
  keywords =     "authorization; policies; secure multi-party
                 computation",
}

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