Entry Kogan:2006:IER from tissec.bib

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BibTeX entry

@Article{Kogan:2006:IER,
  author =       "Noam Kogan and Tamir Tassa",
  title =        "Improved efficiency for revocation schemes via
                 {Newton} interpolation",
  journal =      j-TISSEC,
  volume =       "9",
  number =       "4",
  pages =        "461--486",
  month =        nov,
  year =         "2006",
  CODEN =        "ATISBQ",
  DOI =          "https://doi.org/10.1145/1187441.1187444",
  ISSN =         "1094-9224 (print), 1557-7406 (electronic)",
  ISSN-L =       "1094-9224",
  bibdate =      "Thu Jun 12 17:51:51 MDT 2008",
  bibsource =    "http://portal.acm.org/;
                 http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/tissec.bib",
  abstract =     "We present a novel way to implement the
                 secret-sharing-based family of revocation schemes of
                 Naor and Pinkas [2003]. The basic scheme of [Naor and
                 Pinkas 2000] uses Shamir's polynomial secret-sharing to
                 revoke up to r users, where r is the degree of the
                 secret-sharing polynomial, and it is information
                 theoretically secure against coalitions of up to r
                 collaborators. The nonrevoked users use Lagrange
                 interpolation in order to compute the new key. Our
                 basic scheme uses a novel modification of Shamir's
                 polynomial secret-sharing: The secret equals the
                 leading coefficient of the polynomial (as opposed to
                 the free coefficient as in the original scheme) and the
                 polynomial is reconstructed by Newton interpolation
                 (rather than Lagrange interpolation). Comparing our
                 scheme to one variant of the Naor--Pinkas scheme, we
                 offer revocation messages that are shorter by a factor
                 of almost 2, while the computation cost at the user end
                 is smaller by a constant factor of approximately 13/2.
                 Comparing to a second variant of the Naor--Pinkas
                 scheme, our scheme offers a reduction of O ( r ) in the
                 computation cost at the user end, without affecting any
                 of the other performance parameters. We then extend our
                 basic scheme to perform multiround revocation for
                 stateless and stateful receivers, along the lines
                 offered by Naor and Pinkas [2000] and Kogan et al.
                 [2003]. We show that using Newton rather than Lagrange
                 interpolants enables a significantly more efficient
                 transmission of the new revocation message and shorter
                 response time for each round. Pay TV systems that
                 implement broadcast encryption techniques can benefit
                 significantly from the improved efficiency offered by
                 our revocation schemes.",
  acknowledgement = ack-nhfb,
  fjournal =     "ACM Transactions on Information and System Security",
  journal-URL =  "http://portal.acm.org/browse_dl.cfm?idx=J789",
  keywords =     "broadcast encryption; Newton interpolation; secret
                 sharing; User revocation",
}

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