Entry Karame:2015:MBS from tissec.bib

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BibTeX entry

@Article{Karame:2015:MBS,
  author =       "Ghassan O. Karame and Elli Androulaki and Marc
                 Roeschlin and Arthur Gervais and Srdjan Capkun",
  title =        "Misbehavior in Bitcoin: a Study of Double-Spending and
                 Accountability",
  journal =      j-TISSEC,
  volume =       "18",
  number =       "1",
  pages =        "2:1--2:??",
  month =        jun,
  year =         "2015",
  CODEN =        "ATISBQ",
  DOI =          "https://doi.org/10.1145/2732196",
  ISSN =         "1094-9224 (print), 1557-7406 (electronic)",
  ISSN-L =       "1094-9224",
  bibdate =      "Wed Jun 10 08:04:25 MDT 2015",
  bibsource =    "http://portal.acm.org/;
                 http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/tissec.bib",
  abstract =     "Bitcoin is a decentralized payment system that relies
                 on Proof-of-Work (PoW) to resist double-spending
                 through a distributed timestamping service. To ensure
                 the operation and security of Bitcoin, it is essential
                 that all transactions and their order of execution are
                 available to all Bitcoin users. Unavoidably, in such a
                 setting, the security of transactions comes at odds
                 with transaction privacy. Motivated by the fact that
                 transaction confirmation in Bitcoin requires tens of
                 minutes, we analyze the conditions for performing
                 successful double-spending attacks against fast
                 payments in Bitcoin, where the time between the
                 exchange of currency and goods is short (in the order
                 of a minute). We show that unless new detection
                 techniques are integrated in the Bitcoin
                 implementation, double-spending attacks on fast
                 payments succeed with considerable probability and can
                 be mounted at low cost. We propose a new and
                 lightweight countermeasure that enables the detection
                 of double-spending attacks in fast transactions. In
                 light of such misbehavior, accountability becomes
                 crucial. We show that in the specific case of Bitcoin,
                 accountability complements privacy. To illustrate this
                 tension, we provide accountability and privacy
                 definition for Bitcoin, and we investigate analytically
                 and empirically the privacy and accountability
                 provisions in Bitcoin.",
  acknowledgement = ack-nhfb,
  articleno =    "2",
  fjournal =     "ACM Transactions on Information and System Security",
  journal-URL =  "http://portal.acm.org/browse_dl.cfm?idx=J789",
}

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