Entry Chan-Tin:2011:FBA from tissec.bib

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BibTeX entry

@Article{Chan-Tin:2011:FBA,
  author =       "Eric Chan-Tin and Victor Heorhiadi and Nicholas Hopper
                 and Yongdae Kim",
  title =        "The {Frog-Boiling} Attack: Limitations of Secure
                 Network Coordinate Systems",
  journal =      j-TISSEC,
  volume =       "14",
  number =       "3",
  pages =        "27:1--27:??",
  month =        nov,
  year =         "2011",
  CODEN =        "ATISBQ",
  DOI =          "https://doi.org/10.1145/2043621.2043627",
  ISSN =         "1094-9224 (print), 1557-7406 (electronic)",
  ISSN-L =       "1094-9224",
  bibdate =      "Thu Dec 15 09:12:37 MST 2011",
  bibsource =    "http://portal.acm.org/;
                 http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/tissec.bib",
  abstract =     "A network coordinate system assigns Euclidean
                 ``virtual'' coordinates to every node in a network to
                 allow easy estimation of network latency between pairs
                 of nodes that have never contacted each other. These
                 systems have been implemented in a variety of
                 applications, most notably the popular Vuze BitTorrent
                 client. Zage and Nita-Rotaru (at CCS 2007) and
                 independently, Kaafar et al. (at SIGCOMM 2007),
                 demonstrated that several widely-cited network
                 coordinate systems are prone to simple attacks, and
                 proposed mechanisms to defeat these attacks using
                 outlier detection to filter out adversarial inputs.
                 Kaafar et al. goes a step further and requires that a
                 fraction of the network is trusted. More recently,
                 Sherr et al. (at USENIX ATC 2009) proposed Veracity, a
                 distributed reputation system to secure network
                 coordinate systems. We describe a new attack on network
                 coordinate systems, Frog-Boiling, that defeats all of
                 these defenses. Thus, even a system with trusted
                 entities is still vulnerable to attacks. Moreover,
                 having witnesses vouch for your coordinates as in
                 Veracity does not prevent our attack. Finally, we
                 demonstrate empirically that the Frog-Boiling attack is
                 more disruptive than the previously known attacks:
                 systems that attempt to reject ``bad'' inputs by
                 statistical means or reputation cannot be used to
                 secure a network coordinate system.",
  acknowledgement = ack-nhfb,
  articleno =    "27",
  fjournal =     "ACM Transactions on Information and System Security",
  journal-URL =  "http://portal.acm.org/browse_dl.cfm?idx=J789",
}

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