Entry Doychev:2015:CTS from tissec.bib

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BibTeX entry

@Article{Doychev:2015:CTS,
  author =       "Goran Doychev and Boris K{\"o}pf and Laurent Mauborgne
                 and Jan Reineke",
  title =        "{CacheAudit}: a Tool for the Static Analysis of Cache
                 Side Channels",
  journal =      j-TISSEC,
  volume =       "18",
  number =       "1",
  pages =        "4:1--4:??",
  month =        jun,
  year =         "2015",
  CODEN =        "ATISBQ",
  DOI =          "https://doi.org/10.1145/2756550",
  ISSN =         "1094-9224 (print), 1557-7406 (electronic)",
  ISSN-L =       "1094-9224",
  bibdate =      "Wed Jun 10 08:04:25 MDT 2015",
  bibsource =    "http://portal.acm.org/;
                 http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/tissec.bib",
  abstract =     "We present CacheAudit, a versatile framework for the
                 automatic, static analysis of cache side channels.
                 CacheAudit takes as input a program binary and a cache
                 configuration and derives formal, quantitative security
                 guarantees for a comprehensive set of side-channel
                 adversaries, namely, those based on observing cache
                 states, traces of hits and misses, and execution times.
                 Our technical contributions include novel abstractions
                 to efficiently compute precise overapproximations of
                 the possible side-channel observations for each of
                 these adversaries. These approximations then yield
                 upper bounds on the amount of information that is
                 revealed. In case studies, we apply CacheAudit to
                 binary executables of algorithms for sorting and
                 encryption, including the AES implementation from the
                 PolarSSL library, and the reference implementations of
                 the finalists of the eSTREAM stream cipher competition.
                 The results we obtain exhibit the influence of cache
                 size, line size, associativity, replacement policy, and
                 coding style on the security of the executables and
                 include the first formal proofs of security for
                 implementations with countermeasures such as preloading
                 and data-independent memory access patterns.",
  acknowledgement = ack-nhfb,
  articleno =    "4",
  fjournal =     "ACM Transactions on Information and System Security",
  journal-URL =  "http://portal.acm.org/browse_dl.cfm?idx=J789",
}

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