Entry Wright:2008:PLA from tissec.bib

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BibTeX entry

@Article{Wright:2008:PLA,
  author =       "Matthew K. Wright and Micah Adler and Brian Neil
                 Levine and Clay Shields",
  title =        "Passive-Logging {Attacks Against Anonymous
                 Communications Systems}",
  journal =      j-TISSEC,
  volume =       "11",
  number =       "2",
  pages =        "3:1--3:??",
  month =        mar,
  year =         "2008",
  CODEN =        "ATISBQ",
  DOI =          "https://doi.org/10.1145/1330332.1330335",
  ISSN =         "1094-9224 (print), 1557-7406 (electronic)",
  ISSN-L =       "1094-9224",
  bibdate =      "Thu Jun 12 17:52:41 MDT 2008",
  bibsource =    "http://portal.acm.org/;
                 http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/tissec.bib",
  abstract =     "Using analysis, simulation, and experimentation, we
                 examine the threat against anonymous communications
                 posed by passive-logging attacks. In previous work, we
                 analyzed the success of such attacks under various
                 assumptions. Here, we evaluate the effects of these
                 assumptions more closely. First, we analyze the Onion
                 Routing-based model used in prior work in which a fixed
                 set of nodes remains in the system indefinitely. We
                 show that for this model, by removing the assumption of
                 uniformly random selection of nodes for placement in
                 the path, initiators can greatly improve their
                 anonymity. Second, we show by simulation that attack
                 times are significantly lower in practice than bounds
                 given by analytical results from prior work. Third, we
                 analyze the effects of a dynamic membership model, in
                 which nodes are allowed to join and leave the system;
                 we show that all known defenses fail more quickly when
                 the assumption of a static node set is relaxed. Fourth,
                 intersection attacks against peer-to-peer systems are
                 shown to be an additional danger, either on their own
                 or in conjunction with the predecessor attack. Finally,
                 we address the question of whether the regular
                 communication patterns required by the attacks exist in
                 real traffic. We collected and analyzed the Web
                 requests of users to determine the extent to which
                 basic patterns can be found. We show that, for our
                 study, frequent and repeated communication to the same
                 Web site is common.",
  acknowledgement = ack-nhfb,
  articleno =    "3",
  fjournal =     "ACM Transactions on Information and System Security",
  journal-URL =  "http://portal.acm.org/browse_dl.cfm?idx=J789",
  keywords =     "anonymity; anonymous communication; intersection
                 attack; predecessor attack; privacy",
}

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