Entry Brandt:2008:EUP from tissec.bib

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BibTeX entry

@Article{Brandt:2008:EUP,
  author =       "Felix Brandt and Tuomas Sandholm",
  title =        "On the Existence of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving
                 Auction Protocols",
  journal =      j-TISSEC,
  volume =       "11",
  number =       "2",
  pages =        "6:1--6:??",
  month =        mar,
  year =         "2008",
  CODEN =        "ATISBQ",
  DOI =          "https://doi.org/10.1145/1330332.1330338",
  ISSN =         "1094-9224 (print), 1557-7406 (electronic)",
  ISSN-L =       "1094-9224",
  bibdate =      "Thu Jun 12 17:52:41 MDT 2008",
  bibsource =    "http://portal.acm.org/;
                 http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/tissec.bib",
  abstract =     "We investigate whether it is possible to preserve
                 privacy in sealed-bid auctions to a maximal extent. In
                 particular, this paper focuses on
                 {$<$}it{$>$}unconditional full privacy{$<$}/it{$>$}, i.
                 e. , privacy that relies neither on trusted third
                 parties (like auctioneers), nor on computational
                 intractability assumptions (like the hardness of
                 factoring). These constraints imply a scenario in which
                 bidders exchange messages according to some predefined
                 protocol in order to jointly determine the auction
                 outcome without revealing any additional information.
                 It turns out that the first-price sealed-bid auction
                 can be emulated by an unconditionally fully private
                 protocol. However, the protocol's round complexity is
                 exponential in the bid size, and there is no more
                 efficient protocol. On the other hand, we prove the
                 impossibility of privately emulating the second-price
                 sealed-bid auction for more than two bidders. This
                 impossibility holds even when relaxing various privacy
                 constraints such as allowing the revelation of all but
                 one losing bid (while maintaining anonymity) or
                 allowing the revelation of the second highest bidder's
                 identity.",
  acknowledgement = ack-nhfb,
  articleno =    "6",
  fjournal =     "ACM Transactions on Information and System Security",
  journal-URL =  "http://portal.acm.org/browse_dl.cfm?idx=J789",
  keywords =     "auctions; multiparty computation",
}

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