Entry Lee:2015:GAP from tissec.bib

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BibTeX entry

@Article{Lee:2015:GAP,
  author =       "Hyojeong Lee and Jeff Seibert and Dylan Fistrovic and
                 Charles Killian and Cristina Nita-Rotaru",
  title =        "{Gatling}: Automatic Performance Attack Discovery in
                 Large-Scale Distributed Systems",
  journal =      j-TISSEC,
  volume =       "17",
  number =       "4",
  pages =        "13:1--13:??",
  month =        apr,
  year =         "2015",
  CODEN =        "ATISBQ",
  DOI =          "https://doi.org/10.1145/2714565",
  ISSN =         "1094-9224 (print), 1557-7406 (electronic)",
  ISSN-L =       "1094-9224",
  bibdate =      "Fri Apr 24 17:39:52 MDT 2015",
  bibsource =    "http://portal.acm.org/;
                 http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/tissec.bib",
  abstract =     "In this article, we propose Gatling, a framework that
                 automatically finds performance attacks caused by
                 insider attackers in large-scale message-passing
                 distributed systems. In performance attacks, malicious
                 nodes deviate from the protocol when sending or
                 creating messages, with the goal of degrading system
                 performance. We identify a representative set of basic
                 malicious message delivery and lying actions and design
                 a greedy search algorithm that finds effective attacks
                 consisting of a subset of these actions. Although lying
                 malicious actions are protocol dependent, requiring the
                 format and meaning of messages, Gatling captures them
                 without needing to modify the target system by using a
                 type-aware compiler. We have implemented and used
                 Gatling on nine systems, a virtual coordinate system, a
                 distributed hash table lookup service and application,
                 two multicast systems and one file sharing application,
                 and three secure systems designed specifically to
                 tolerate insiders, two based on virtual coordinates and
                 one using Outlier Detection, one invariant derived from
                 physical laws, and the last one a Byzantine resilient
                 replication system. We found a total of 48 attacks,
                 with the time needed to find each attack ranging from a
                 few minutes to a few hours.",
  acknowledgement = ack-nhfb,
  articleno =    "13",
  fjournal =     "ACM Transactions on Information and System Security",
  journal-URL =  "http://portal.acm.org/browse_dl.cfm?idx=J789",
}

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