Entry Hevia:1999:STD from tissec.bib

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BibTeX entry

@Article{Hevia:1999:STD,
  author =       "Alejandro Hevia and Marcos Kiwi",
  title =        "Strength of Two {Data Encryption Standard}
                 Implementations under Timing Attack",
  journal =      j-TISSEC,
  volume =       "2",
  number =       "4",
  pages =        "416--437",
  month =        nov,
  year =         "1999",
  CODEN =        "ATISBQ",
  ISSN =         "1094-9224 (print), 1557-7406 (electronic)",
  ISSN-L =       "1094-9224",
  bibdate =      "Thu Oct 26 11:39:38 MDT 2000",
  bibsource =    "http://www.acm.org/tissec/contents/v2no2.html;
                 http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/tissec.bib",
  URL =          "http://www.acm.org/pubs/citations/journals/tissec/1999-2-4/p416-hevia/",
  abstract =     "We study the vulnerability of two implementations of
                 the Data Encryption Standard (DES) cryptosystem under a
                 timing attack. A timing attack is a method, recently
                 proposed by Paul Kocher, that is designed to break
                 cryptographic systems. It exploits the engineering
                 aspects involved in the implementation of cryptosystems
                 and might succeed even against cryptosystems that
                 remain impervious to sophisticated cryptanalytic
                 techniques. A timing attack is, essentially, a way of
                 obtaining some users private information by carefully
                 measuring the time it takes the user to carry out
                 cryptographic operations. In this work, we analyze two
                 implementations of DES. We show that a timing attack
                 yields the Hamming weight of the key used by both DES
                 implementations. Moreover, the attack is
                 computationally inexpensive. We also show that all the
                 design characteristics of the target system, necessary
                 to carry out the timing attack, can be inferred from
                 timing measurements.",
  acknowledgement = ack-nhfb,
  fjournal =     "ACM Transactions on Information and System Security",
  generalterms = "Security",
  journal-URL =  "http://portal.acm.org/browse_dl.cfm?idx=J789",
  keywords =     "cryptanalysis; cryptography; data encryption standard;
                 timing attack",
  subject =      "Data --- Data Encryption (E.3): {\bf Data encryption
                 standard (DES)**}; Computer Systems Organization ---
                 Special-Purpose and Application-Based Systems (C.3)",
}

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